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INTRODUCTION
On December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States decided its
first case on insider trading in nearly twenty years,2 Salnan v. United States.' The
decision was widely anticipated, with many commentators hoping that it would
"provide much-needed clarity to an area of insider trading law made murky by
aggressive government prosecutions and [inharmonious] court decisions," namely
the "personal-benefit-test" as it relates to tippers who make gifts of confidential
information to trading relatives or friends.! Salman held, contrary to an earlier
Second Circuit decision,s that a gift of inside information to family or friends is
enough to support an insider trading conviction even when the tipper does not
receive a pecuniary or other valuable benefit in return.' But the Supreme Court did
not say much more.
Salman left many commentators disappointed for the way in which it
"studiously . .. avoids addressing [many] issues related to insider trading law.'" One
critic lamented that the Court "missed an opportunity to significantly clarify [what
kind of] relationship is sufficient to satisfy [the] 'personal benefit' test."' Another
opined that the Court's "new standard [for what constitutes a personal benefit to a
tipper] lacks clarity and inconsistent holdings will continue." In slightly less
apocalyptic tones, the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell noted that "Salman left
unanswered important question about the reach of liability."'o
My goal in this Article is to answer some of the lingering questions that Sabnan
left unanswered. Specifically, I will examine the following three aspects of the
personal-benefit est as it relates to tippers who make gifts of inside information to
2Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Upholds "Fniends and Family"Insider-Trading
Conviction, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 6,2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/12/opinion-
analysis-court-upholds-friends-and-family-insider-trading-conviction/ [https://perma.cc/4KUH-
66U5].
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
4 Nicolas Morgan, Thomas A. Zaccaro & Jenifer Q Doan, Salman v. US: Will It Change the
"Personal Beneft" Test?, LAw360 (Aug. 3, 2016, 12:59 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/823740/salman-v-us-will-it-change-the-personal-benefit-test
[https://perma.cc/SQD6-G3ML].
s United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d Cir. 2014).
6 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427-28.
' Michael Guttentag, Salman Insider Tradng Case a Hollow Win for Prosecutors, LAw360 (Dec.
16, 2016, 10:18 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/873250/salnan-insider-trading-case-a-hollow-
win-for-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/49TM-6YQA] ("There are only two footnotes in the opinion, and
both are dedicated to clarifying the extent to which it does not address other related topics.").
8 Raphael Davidian, Note, It's AllDerivative: Insider Trading Without a Personal Benet, 54 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 24,24 (2017).
' Tony Arias, Note, Love Is All You Need: The Supreme Court Clarifies the Standard for Tipper-
Tippee Liabilry Under Insider Trading, 94 DENv. L. REV. ONLINE, Jan. 30, 2017, at 1.
'o Salman v. United States, Supreme Court Addresses Scope of Ciminal Insider-Trading Liabilty
for Tippees, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, Dec. 7, 2016, at 3,
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC-Publication-Salman_v_UnitedStatesSupreme
CourtAddressesScopeofCriminalInsiderTradingLiabiltyforTippees.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75PZ-NXL8] [hereinafter SULLIVAN & CROMWELL].
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trading relatives or friends: (1) What kind of relationship must a tipper and tippee
have to infer a non-pecuniary personal benefit? (2) Exactly what role does the
trading-relative-or-friend test play in an insider trading analysis? Is it a liability
standard? Surplusage? Or something else entirely? (3) Who counts as a relative or
friend?
Briefly, my considered answers are as follows: (1) No relationship is necessary at
all. All that is necessary is a gift or other exchange whose purpose could have been
accomplished just as well had the tipper traded on the inside information himself
and then exchanged the profits instead of the information. (2) The trading-relative-
or-friend test is an evidentiary rule allowing a jury to assume that a tipper makes a
gift upon providing inside information to a trading relative or friend. (3) Persons
who count as relatives or friends are those with meaningfully dose personal
relationships to the tipper as determined by the factfinder based on the totality of
circumstances.
1. INSIDER TRADING BASICS
Any discussion of insider trading must begin with the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.11 The history of the Securities Exchange Act as it relates to insider
trading-a topic that other authors have already done an excellent job of covering in
excruciating detaill 2-need not be repeated here. Instead, I will begin with the most
important provision for this Article's purposes, Section 10(b). The relevant portion
of § 10(b) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange- ... To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any
securities-based swap agreement any mnampulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.1
3
At first glance, this is a strange criminal statute. First, it is found in Title 15 of
the United States Code, not in Title 18 with the majority of the criminal statutes.
Beyond that, it is remarkably broad and devoid of specifics. It does not contain the
n Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 [hereinafter Securities Act of
1934].
12 See generally ELIZABETH SzoCKYj, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A
LEVEL PLAYING FIELD (1993); Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A
Historica/ Introduction to the Securties Act of1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of1934, 49 OHIO
ST. LJ. 329 (1988).
" Securities Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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term "insider trading" or anything like unto it.' 4 The only two substantive
requirements in the statute (in italics above) are that a person may not (1) use "any
manipulative or deceptive device" (2) "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."" And these requirements do not themselves define the contours of any
specific crime.'6 Instead, they form the outer perimeter of a large area containing a
diverse range of activities that all (may) fall under the category of "securities fraud.""
But not all acts that fall within this perimeter are necessarily unlawful. The only uses
of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities that are unlawful are those that are also "in contravention of rules
prescribed by the [SEC]."' Thus, it is left to the SEC to define what acts to
criminalize-so long as it stays within the outer perimeter created by § 10(b). 9
"Pursuant to [this] § 10(b) rulemaking authority, the [SEC] has adopted Rule
10b-5."20 The pertinent sections of Rule 10b-5 read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, .. or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.21
14 Some scholars have argued, persuasively, that Congress did not originally intend for insider trading
to fall within the scope of § 10(b). See SZOCKYJ, supra note 12, at 6 ("Nowhere in the legislation or in
related discussions at the time is there an implication that Section 10(b) should be interpreted to include
or could be applied against insider trading.") (quoted in Sara Almousa, Comment, Fiends with Benefits?
Caring the Role Relationships Play in Satisfing the Personal Benefit Requirement Under Tipper-
Tippec Liabity, 23 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1251, 1255 n.34 (2016)). Regardless of Congress's original
intent, however, Section 10(b) has become the statute under which the government regulates insider
trading activity, Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law ofInsider Trading: Legal Theories,
Common Defenses, and Best Practices forEnsuring Complance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. &BUS. 151, 156 (2011);
and Congress ratified this understanding by passing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of2000,
Section 303(d)(2) of which acknowledges that the rules promulgated under and the judicial precedents
decided under Section 10(b) appropriately govern insider trading. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 106-554, § 303(d)(2), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-454 (2000).
"s Securities Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651
(1997).
16 See Securities Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
17 See OHagan, 521 U.S. at 651 ("The provision, as written, does not confne its coverage to
deception of a purchaser or seller of securities; rather, the statute reaches any deceptive device used 'in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.'" (citation omitted)).
18 id.
'9 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hoclifelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (holding, specifically in the context of
Rule 10b-5, that the SEC cannot criminalize conduct that falls outside the bounds of the perimeter set
by Congress in § 10(b)).
20 O'asgan, 521 U.S. at 651.
21 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
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If you were hoping for a dear statement of "Thou shalt not trade on material,
non-public information," then Rule 10b-5 is disappointing. The Rule is nearly as
broad as § 10(b)-it first recapitulates the same preface/jurisdictional hook used by
§ 10(b) and then prohibits general deceptive acts in connection with dealing in
securities.2 The only substance that Rule 10b-5 adds to § 10(b) is that the
"manipulative or deceptive" devices and practices forbidden must involve elements of
fraud.23 Therefore, if the activities we now associate with insider trading were to be
criminalized under Rule lOb-5, they had to be characterized as fraud.24
Unfortunately, the SEC did not promulgate regulations making that
characterization. Exactly what activities could constitute fraud and exactly who could
be a legitimate target of fraud thus became the subjects of heated litigation, and the
exact elements of "insider trading" as we now know it developed through the
common law method.25 Over time, two theories of how insider trading could
constitute fraud emerged: the "classical theory" and the "misappropriation theory."2 '
A. The Classical and Misapproptiation Theories oflnsider Trading
The classical theory of insider trading applies "when a corporate insider trades in
the securities of [the tipper's] corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic
information."27 To be dear, a "corporate insider" in this situation is a person who is
actually inside the corporation whose securities are at issue-either permanent
employees or other persons who temporarily owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation
itself.2 8 Trading on material, nonpublic information by a corporate fiduciary is fraud
under Rule 10b-5.29 A fraud occurs in these circumstances because there is "a
relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and
those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their
position."3 That relationship of trust creates a fiduciary duty by which the insider
must not use the information either to benefit himself or to the detriment of the
shareholders-the ultimate owners of the company-who do not have access to the
same information." Practically speaking, this requires the corporate insider to either
refrain from trading in the corporation's stock entirely, or make disclosures to the
shareholder prior to trading in order to eliminate the informational gap.3 2 Therefore,
' Compare id, with Securities Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
2 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a),(c) (both employing a variation on the word "fraud" in
describing the unlawfusl activities).
24 see id
25 See, e.g., United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
26 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
27 Id. at 651-52.
28 Id. at 652.
29 id
3 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
31 Id at 228-29.
32 id.
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when the insider trades on the basis of the inside information-unfairly depriving
the shareholders of their ownership in the corporation-the insider breaches his duty
and commits fraud.3 3
The misappropriation theory-formally endorsed by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Hagan-applies to situations in which a corporate outsider
"misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach
of a duty owed to the source of the information.' In these circumstances, there is a
relationship of trust between the principal, the source of the confidential information
that bears exclusive rights to the use of that information, and the fiduciary, who is
entrusted with the information to further the principal's designs. 3 This relationship
creates a duty by which the fiduciary must not use the confidential information in
violation of the principal's exclusive right to use that information. 6 The fiduciary
violates this duty and commits fraud when he uses the information for
securities-trading purposes, thus robbing the principal of its rights to exclusive use
of the information."
B. Tipper-Tippee Liabilty
But what happens when the fiduciary (under either the classical or
misappropriation theory of insider trading8) does not himself trade on the material,
nonpublic information, but instead acts as a tipper by giving the information to a
third party (a "tippee") who, in turn, trades on the information? A cursory
examination of both the classical and the misappropriation theories of insider trading
reveals that both predicate liability on the existence and violation of a fiduciary duty
arising from a relationship of trust." This is not accidental. The Supreme Court has
dearly held that one who trades on inside information cannot be criminally liable for
doing so unless one trades in violation of a duty to disclose or a duty not to trade."
Further, that duty must "arise[] from a specific relationship between two parties," a
relationship that typically does not exist between either a corporation's shareholders
and a tippee (in the context of the classical theory) or a principal and a tippee (in the
context of the misappropriation theory).4 This creates "difficulties for the SEC and
courts in policing tippees who trade on inside information."42 Does this mean, then,
that tippees may 'trade on second-hand insider information with impunity? It
depends.
" Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 n.2 (2016).
34 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
3 5 id.
36 id.
37 Id.
" In Salman, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the same tipper-tippee/personal-
benefit "analysis applies in both classical and misappropriation cases." 137 S. Ct. at 425 n.2.
3 Id.
' Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,655-56 (1983).
41 Id. at 655 (internal quotation omitted).
42 Id. at 654-55.
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A tippee's liability for insider trading depends on whether the tipper, in giving
the "tip" to the tippee, breached his own fiduciary duty.4 3 In other words, "the tippee's
duty to disclose or abstain," and the attendant possibility of criminal sanctions, "is
derivative from that of the insider's duty."" In situations where the tipper, in
disclosing the inside information to the tippee, breaches his own fiduciary duty and
the tippee knows or should know that the tipper breached his duty, the "tippee
assumes [the insider's] fiduciary duty."45 At that point, because the tippee has
assumed a duty identical to that of the tipper, the tippee may likewise be held
criminally liable for failing to disclose or failing to abstain from trading on that
information.
Because tippee liability is derivative of tipper liability, the first question to answer
in determining whether a tippee is criminally liable for insider trading is whether, in
disclosing confidential insider information to the tippee, the tipper breached his own
fiduciary duty. 6 Not "[a]ll disclosures of confidential corporate information"
constitute violations of a fiduciary's duty.47 The test for determining whether a
particular disclosure of inside information constitutes a breach of a fiduciary duty "is
whether the [fiduciary] personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure. Absent some personal [benefit], there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders."4 8 The question is what constitutes a personal benefit.
II. DIRKS, NEWMN, AND SALMAN: THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL BENEFIT
The question of what constitutes a personal benefit to a tipper in the context of
insider trading has been the subject of a long line of litigation. The most recent case
on this subject is Salman v. UnitedStates, which was decided on December 6, 2016.49
In order to understand Salman, however, it is useful to understand two other
cases-Dirks v. SECo and United States v. Newman.s' I shall briefly des&ibe each
case in chronological order.
43 Id. at 661 ("In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it ... is
necessary to determine whether the insider's 'tip' constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty.").
4 Id. at 559.
45 Id. at 660-61.
' Id. at 662 ("[A]bsent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.").
47 Id. at 661-62.
4 Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
' Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
5 Dirks, 463 U.S. 646.
sl United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
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A. Dirks v. SEC: The Supreme Court Establishes the Personal-Benefit
Framework
In Salman, the Supreme Court wrote that Dirks"established the personal-benefit
framework" for insider trading cases.52 The facts of Dirks were as follows. Ronald
Secrist was a former officer (an insider) of Equity Funding of America ("EFA"), a
publicly-traded corporation that sold life insurance and mutual funds.s" Secrist knew
that EFA was engaged in fraudulent corporate practices and wished to expose the
fraud.54 Secrist and other EFA employees had already reported the fraud to various
regulatory agencies, but those agencies failed to take action.ss Determined to expose
the fraud, Secrist then contacted defendant Raymond Dirks, an officer at a "broker-
dealer firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company
securities to institutional investors." 6 Secrist "urged Dirks to verify the fraud and
disclose it publicly."s" Dirks investigated the allegations and confirmed that they were
true.5 8
During his investigation, Dirks "openly discussed the information he had
obtained with a number of clients and investors" and also with the Wall Street
Journal (which initially refused to publish the story).9 As a result of Dirks's sharing
the inside information, his clients and investors liquidated nearly $15 million in EFA
holdingso and the price of EFA stock fell nearly 50% over a two-week period.6' After
this, the SEC finally investigated and filed a complaint against EFA and the Wall
StreetJournal ran a front-page story based on the information Dirks had assembled.62
The SEC then charged Dirks with violations of Rule lOb-5 (insider trading) for
"repeating the allegations of fraud to members of the investment community who
later sold their [EFA] stock."63 The SEC concluded that Dirks violated insider
trading laws, and Dirks appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.64
The Supreme Court first decided that because Dirks was a tippee, his liability
was derivative and depended on the existence of an initial breach of duty on the part
of the tipper, Secrist.s In order to determine whether Secrist had breached his
52 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425 n.2.
s1 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
54 Id. at 649.
s id.
56 Id. at 648-49.
s7 Id. at 649.
s' Id. at 649-50.
s9 Id.
60 Id. at 669-70 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). This is equivalent to $91.94 million in today's money (as
of July 2017). CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl?costl=16.00&yearl=197301&year2=201707 [https://perma.cc/2E6J-SN3C] (last visited
Jan. 31, 2018).
61 Id. at 650.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 651.
64 Id. at 651-52.
65 Id. at 661-62; see supra Part I.
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fiduciary duty to EFA in revealing information about the fraud to Dirks, the Court
had to determine whether Secrist personally benefited from the disclosure.
6 6 The
Court said that this analysis "require[d] courts to focus on objective criteria."6 7 The
Court specified that "a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into
future earnings" were among these objective criteria.6 ' These would seem to be the
most direct examples of a tipper personally benefiting from his disclosure.
But the Court also wrote that there are "objective facts and circumstances that,"
while not as direct as pecuniary or reputational gains, "often justify [the inference
that the tipper has personally benefitted]."69 These facts and circumstances include
the relationship between the tipper and the tippee or the intent to benefit the
tippee.o In other words, there is an entire class of non-pecuniary personal benefits
that a tipper may receive that expose the tipper to insider trading liability. The Court
also made a particularly strong statement concerning gifts: "The elements of fiduciary
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a
gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend."7 ' The meaning and
importance of that italicized phrase is the center of the Newman and Salman cases
(and this article).
Applying these criteria to the facts before it, the Court in Diks found that Secrist
did not breach his own fiduciary duty (meaning that Dirks could therefore share and
trade on the inside information with impunity).7 2 Secrist received no monetary
benefit for disclosing the information; there was no relationship between him and
Dirks that suggested a quid pro quo took place; Secrist did not intend to benefit
Dirks; and, importantly Secrist's purpose was not to make a valuable gift to Dirks.7
B. United States v. Newman: The Second Circuit Decides Giving a Gift to a
Trading Fiend or Relative Is not Enough to Establish Insider Trading Liabilty
More recently, in United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit expressed
skepticism that the personal-benefit requirement of Dirks could be satisfied by
merely making a gift to a family member or friend.74 Newman and his codefendants
were portfolio managers at a hedge fund." Prosecutors showed that insiders at Dell
and NVIDIA routinely passed inside information to analysts at the hedge fund."
The information would then pass through several different people before ending up
6 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
67 Id. at 663.
6
s id.
6 Id. at 664.
70 d
7 Id. (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 666.
7 Id. at 667.
7 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452-53 (2d Cir. 2014).
7s Id. at 442-43.
76 Id. at 443.
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on Newman's desk." Newman would then trade on the information." In total, the
trades on this material, non-public information made by Newman and his co-
defendants resulted in more than $70 million in profits for their respective hedge
funds.7 ' Newman was three steps removed from the Dell insiders, four steps removed
from the NVIDIA insiders, and he did not know who the sources of the inside
information were.8 0
The Second Circuit found that Newman was not guilty of insider trading for two
reasons." First, and uncontroversially, the court found that Newman did not meet
the knowledge requirement for tipper-tippee insider trading liability-he knew
neither the source of the information nor whether the initial tipper had personally
benefitted from his tip.82 Second, and more importantly, the court held that a
personal benefit to a tipper could not be inferred from the fact that the tippee was a
family member or casual friend (however those terms may be defined) of the tipper."
Permitting such inferences would predicate criminal insider trading liability on the
receipt of such amorphous personal benefits as "friendship" and "career advice."'84
The court reasoned that if it allowed such amorphous personal benefits to be inferred
from such casual relationships, then "the personal benefit requirement would be a
nullity." 5 Therefore, the Second Circuit held that in order for a tipper to personally
benefit from a transfer of inside information to a trading relative or friend, the
exchange of information must occur in the context "of a meaningfully close personal
relationship" and must represent "at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature."" In other words, unless there is a legitimate likelihood of additional
money or other material goods flowing into the tipper's coffers, there can be no
finding of personal benefit to the tipper.
C. Salman v. United States: The Supreme Court Reaffrms Dirks
Maher Kara was an investment banker for Citigroup.7 He and his brother,
Michael, were very dose." Maher began divulging confidential information to
Michael in order to get Michael's help in understanding scientific concepts relevant
77Id.
785m
79id
80 Id.
e Id. at 452-53.
82 Id. at 452-53; see id. at 442("[T]he Government presented no evidence that Newman ... knew
that [he was] trading on information obtained from insiders in violation of those insiders' fiduciary
duties.").
1 Id. at 442, 452.
84 Id. at 452-53.
s Id. at 452.
86 Id.
* Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016).
8 Id. ("The evidence at trial established that Maher and Michael enjoyed a very close relationship.
Maher loved his brother very much, Michael was like a second father to Maher, and Michael was the best
man at Maher's wedding to Salman's sister." (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted)).
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to the companies Maher was analyzing for Citigroup, since Michael had a chemistry
background." Unbeknownst to Maher, Michael began trading on this inside
information."o Eventually, however, Maher learned of Michael's insider trading. But
rather than cease giving information to his brother, Maher began providing more
information in order to aid Michael in his trading ventures." Meanwhile, Michael
was also spreading the inside information to others, including the defendant, Bassam
Salman, Maher's brother-in-law.9 2 Salman traded on this information and was
subsequently convicted of insider trading.3
On appeal, Salman conceded that Maher, the tipper, gave the information as
gifts to his brother Michael.9' But Salman, invoking Newman-decided between the
time of Salman's convictions and his appeal-argued that a mere gift of inside
information between family members was not enough to infer that Maher personally
benefited from the tips or establish securities fraud."s Instead, Maher must have
received something akin to a pecuniary benefit-"money, property, or something of
tangible value." 6 The Supreme Court, however, flatly rejected that argument.97
Relying exclusively on Dirks, the Court held that a mere gift of confidential
information between trading relatives is enough to infer a personal benefit on the
part of the tipper.98 Newman, to the extent it conflicted with this holding and
required the tipper to receive an additional pecuniary benefit beyond the gift itself,
was specifically abrogated.99
As a result of this holding, Salman's conviction was upheld.'"t Maher personally
benefited from his disclosure of confidential information to Michael because the
disclosure was a gift.'o Therefore, Maher breached his fiduciary duty to Citigroup
and its dient.102 Salman received this information with full knowledge that it was
improperly-disclosed inside information, that the information came from Maher,
and that Maher had gifted the information to Michael.10 3 As such, Salman assumed
8 See id.
9 Id.
91 Seeid ("Maher testified that he shared inside information with his brother ... with the expectation
that his brother would trade on it.").
92 d
9 Id. at 424-25.
94 Id. at 425.
95 See id. at 425-26.
6 Id. at 426.
9' Id. at 427-28.
98 See id. at 427 ("We adhere to Dirks, which easily resolves the narrow issue presented here.").
9 See id. at 428 ("To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something
of a 'pecuniary or similarly valuable nature' in exchange for a gift to family or friends, we agree with the
Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks." (internal quotations omitted) (citation
omitted) (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d. Cir. 2014))).
10 Id. at 429.
'1 Id. at 427-28.
102 See id
103 Id. at 425, 428.
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the same fiduciary duty possessed initially by Maher and, when he used that
information to benefit himself on the securities market, committed fraud through
insider trading.'04
III. ANSWERING QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN AFTER SALMAN
Following Salman, many practitioners and commentators were perturbed by the
narrow, limited scope of the Court's decision and by the questions the court left
unanswered."os These commentators have a point. The Court issued an intentionally
narrow opinion, stating that it would not address more difficult applications of
"Dirks's rule concerning gifts," leaving those questions for another day.'0 6 My goal
now is to use the hints present in Salman and its predecessors to predict how the
Court will answer these questions when it is finally forced to do so. Specifically, I
will address these three questions: (1) What kind of relationship must a tipper and
tippee have to infer a non-pecuniary personal benefit? (2) Exactly what role does the
trading-relative-or-friend test play in an insider trading analysis? Is it a liability
standard? Surplusage? Or something else entirely? (3) Who counts as a relative or
friend?
A. What Kind ofRelationship Must a Tipper and Tippee Have to Infer a
Non-Pecuriary Personal Benefit? None. Salman's and Dirk's Functional Test for
Finding Personal Benefits Apples Whether the Tippee Is a Fiend, a Relative, or a
Complete Stranger
What kind of relationship must a tipper and tippee have to infer a non-pecuniary
personal benefit? Or, as one commentator phrased the issue, "where a tippee is not a
friend or relative, what constitutes an exchange sufficient to constitute a non-
pecuniary personal benefit?"0 7 The question assumes that, after Salman, what
constitutes a non-pecuniary personal benefit when the tippee is a friend or relative is
different from what constitutes a non-pecuniary personal benefit when the tippee is
not. More specifically, the question relies on an interpretation of Salman in which a
gift of material, non-public information to a friend or relative of the tipper creates a
personal benefit to the tipper while a gift of the exact same material, non-public
information to a person totally unconnected to the tipper would not create a personal
benefit to the tipper.0 8 Thus, the relationship between the tipper and the tippee is
an essential element of determining liability when a gift or other non-pecuniary
exchange is involved. Some commentators have gone so far as to say that a "close
'0 See id. at 428.
10 See supra Introduction.
106 See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 429.
17 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 10, at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
108 See id. at 2-3.
Vol. 106444
2017-2018 You Don't Need Love ... But It Helps: 445
Insider Trading Law After Salman
relationship" between the tipper and the tippee is itself the personal benefit;'09 or, as
one put it, "Love is All You Need"o to derive a personal benefit from making a gift
of confidential information.
The entire preceding paradigm is incorrect. With all due respect to earlier
commentators and the Beatles, love is not all you need. Actually, you do not need
love at all."' Read correctly, Salman and the cases before it do not require a tipper
and a tippee to be friends or relatives in order for a gift of confidential information
between them to give rise to a personal benefit. The standards for liability are the
same whether the tipper gives information to a relative, to a friend, or to a complete
stranger.
In Dirks, the Supreme Court provided a test for determining whether-or, better
said, explaining why-giving a gift of confidential information constitutes a personal
benefit to the tipper.11 2 The Court explained that giving a gift of confidential
information to a tippee who then trades on the information "resemble[s] trading by
the insider himself followed by a gift of profits to the recipient.""' Just as an insider
cannot argue that he did not personally benefit from insider trading because he gifted
away all of his ill-gotten gains,1 1 4 an insider cannot argue that he did not personally
benefit because he gifted the information instead of the cash and let the recipient do
the actual trading. In both cases, the personal benefit the insider derives from making
the gift is not "friendship" or some other amorphous benefit,"'s but the value of the
profits derived from trading on the information that the insider could have opted to
keep to himself.
So Dirks provides a test for ascertaining personal benefit that is functional in
nature. The test turns on whether the tipper could have accomplished his purposes
by first trading on the information himself and then transferring the profits to the
tippee instead of the information."' Gifts of inside information constitute a personal
109 See Almousa, supra note 14, at 1252. Even commentators who are more skeptical of mere
"friendship" satisfying the personal benefit requirement have opined that "a much closer relationship than
simply being 'friends'" is likely enough to constitute a personal benefit under existing Supreme Court
precedent. Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330,
347-48 (2013). Both of these positions, however, reach the same fundamental conclusion that a
sufficiently close relationship is itselfa personal benefit to the tipper. Id; see alsoAlmousa, supra note 14,
at 1265-66.
11 Arias, supra note 9, at 1.
n1 Thus, Tina Turner had it right when she sang "What's Love Got to Do with It?" Sorry, Beatles.
Compare THE BEATLES, All You Need Is Love, on MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR (Capitol Records)
(1967) (asserting, incorrectly, that "love is all you need"), with TINA TURNER, What's Love Got to Do
with It, on PRIVATE DANCER (Capitol Records) (1984) (asking "what's love got to do . .. with it?" and
implying, correctly, that love has nothing to do with it).
112 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
113 id.
114 d
us A type of benefit that neither Dirks nor any subsequent Supreme Court case ever endorsed.
116 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (finding that a gift of confidential information to a tippee who then
trades on the information is equivalent to "trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits
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benefit to the tipper because gifts meet this functional test."' Every gift of inside
information is functionally the same as a gift of ill-gotten gains."" It follows that
every gift of inside information results in a personal benefit to the tipper.
Further, this test applies beyond the context of friends and relatives. It turns not
on the relationship between the tipper and the tippee, but instead applies equally in
the context of giving a gift to a complete stranger. Imagine the following: A corporate
insider is on a road trip. While passing through a town that he has never been in
before and never will be in again, he stops to fill up his car at the gas station. One
pump over from him, he sees a young couple with two little children and overhears
them discussing their dire financial straits. The corporate insider does not know this
couple-they have never met, and they certainly are not related. Nonetheless, he
takes pity on the couple, walks over to them, and says:
You don't know me, but I'm an executive at XYZ Corp. I overheard some
of your conversation and I think I can help. I don't have money to give
you right now, but as soon as you get home, gather up all of your savings
and borrow whatever money you can and purchase as many shares ofXYZ
Corp. stock as you possibly can. We're announcing record earnings and a
new product line next week-our stock is going to soar. Just don't tell
anyone else.
The corporate insider then walks away and never sees or hears from the young couple
again. The young couple does as instructed and makes $30,000 the next week.
Notice how the fact that the executive and the young couple had no meaningful
connections does not change the interchangeable nature of the inside information
and money in the foregoing scenario. The tipper could have traded on the inside
information himself and then given the proceeds to the poor family and
accomplished the same purpose (i.e., giving the family something of monetary value).
In those circumstances, no one would contend that the tipper did not personally
benefit. Yet, it is functionally equivalent to what the tipper actually did in gifting
away the inside information about XYZ Corp. Therefore, under the Dirks test, the
benefit that the tipper gained from his gift of information was not a warm-and-fuzzy
feeling for helping a family in need, but the $30,000 that he still has in his pocket by
gifting inside information instead of his own money."' The relationship, or lack
thereof, between the executive and the young couple adds nothing to the analysis.
to the recipient"); see also Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (reasoning that giving a
gift of confidential information with the knowledge or intent that the tippee will trade on it "is little
different from trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out to the" tippee).
117 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667 (implying that, had the tippers received monetary or personal benefit
from revealing EFA's secrets or made a gift of valuable information to Dirks, they may have breached
their duties).
... Id. at 664.
n' The benefit may be easier to see if we compare the tipper's net worth in three different situations:
(1) where he gifts his own money, (2) where he trades on the inside information himself and then makes
a gift of the profits, and (3) where he makes a gift of the inside information itself. Imagine the tipper starts
with a net worth of $500,000. If the tipper simply gifted $30,000 to the poor family, his net worth would
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Further proof that the gift-giving principle is meant to be applied without regard
to the relationship between the tipper and the tippee comes from the way the Court
applied the test in the Dirks opinion itself. In Dirks, there was no contention that
Secrist (the tipper) and Dirks were in any way related or friends.'2 0 Despite that,
when the majority explains why Secrist did not personally benefit by sharing
confidential information with Dirks, it specifically notes that Secrist's "purpose [was
not] to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks."12 ' This line strongly implies
that, had Secrist's purpose been to make a gift to Dirks, Secrist would have personally
benefited despite not being family or friend to Dirks at all. Thus, liability under this
functional, gift-giving principle is not limited to gifts between friends or relatives.
The reasoning underlying Dirks's functional test was reaffirmed in Salman.12 2 In
explaining why Maher personally benefited from making a gift of confidential
information to his brother, the Court explained that "when a tipper gives inside
information to 'a trading relative or friend,' the jury can infer that the tipper meant
to provide the equivalent of a cash gift."1 23 The Court continued, clarifying that "[i]n
such situations, the tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading
information is the same thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the
proceeds."'24 Although the Court refers to "trading relative[s] [and] friend[s]," this
reference is best understood as reflecting the Court's intentional narrowing of the
scope of its decision to reflect the particular facts of the case.125 Unlike the parties in
Dirks, the Kara brothers and Salman were family and close friends.12 6 More
important is the sentence in which the Court explains why the gift of information
personally benefitted Maher.127 The Court did not rely on Maher's familial and
fraternal ties.128 Rather, the Court invoked the same reasoning it applied outside of
the family-and-friends context in Dirks, namely that gifts give rise to personal
benefits because they are the same as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the
proceeds.12 9
then be $470,000. Next, imagine the tipper trades on the inside information himself and makes $30,000
in ill-gotten profit, which he then gifts to the poor couple. In this case, his net worth remains $500,000,
making it easy to see that the tipper got the personal benefit of $30,000 in profits because he performed
the exact same charitable act but ended up $30,000 better off than he would have been had he gifted his
own money. Finally, imagine the tipper makes a gift of inside information to the poor couple, who then
trade on it themselves. In this case, the tipper's net worth at the end again remains $500,000-$30,000
more than it would have been had he gifted his own money instead of the information. That extra $30,000
is the personal benefit that the tipper gained from making a gift of the information.
120 See gencrally Dirks, 463 U.S. 646.
121 Id. at 667.
122 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016).
'2' Id. at 428.
1
24 
d
125 Id.
126 Id. at 424.
127 Id. at 428.
128 id.
129 Id. at 428-29.
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The language of the Salman opinion indicates that the Court did not intend to
make any sweeping statements concerning the role of relationships in insider trading
cases.13 0 The Court stated that it would not address more difficult applications of
"Dirks's rule concerning gifts" because "Salman's conduct [was] in the heartland of'
that rule.' But if Salman's conduct (i.e., receiving a "gift of confidential information
[from] a trading relative")132 is only the heartland of Dirks's rule, then the rule itself
encompasses more than that. That "more" consists of gifts to persons other than
trading relatives and friends, persons who, though they present harder cases,
nonetheless fall within the ambit of "Dirks's gift-giving standard"'33 as this Article
argues.
Having reviewed both Salnan and Dirks, it is possible to provide a general
statement of the rule governing when an exchange of inside information constitutes
a non-pecuniary benefit: An exchange sufficient to confer a non-pecuniary personal
benefit on a tipper occurs whenever the tipper could have accomplished the purpose
of the exchange by transferring money as opposed to the inside information.'34 In all
such cases, the core principle of the functional test in Dirks and Salnan-that such
an exchange is equivalent to "trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and
doling them out""'s-is satisfied. Therefore, whether a tipper and a tippee are
friends, relatives, or strangers, does not change what conduct is subject to criminal
penalties under insider trading law. 6
i. Practical Applications
At this point, some concrete illustrations may be helpful to show how this
functional test works. In Dirks, Secrist's purpose in disclosing inside information to
Dirks was to reveal the fraudulent corporate practices of his former employer.3 7 To
determine whether this disclosure created a personal benefit for Secrist, we apply the
functional test. The functional test requires that we ask, whether Secrist could have
accomplished his purpose by trading on the inside information himself and then
130 See id. at 427 (emphasizing "the narrow issue presented here").
13 Id. at 429.132 
id
133 Id. at 427-28.
134 See id. at 428 (finding equivalence between inside information and cash in the context of insider
trading).
135 id.
136 1 would be remiss at this point not to note the similarities and differences of my argument in this
Article and the Government's argument in Salman. In Salman, the Government argued (1) "that a gift of
confidential information to anyone, not just a trading relative or friend, is enough to prove securities fraud"
and (2) that "a tipper personally benefits whenever the tipper discloses confidential trading information
for a noncorporate purpose." Id. at 426 (internal quotations omitted). I agree with the Government as to
its first argument, but I disagree with the Government as to its second argument. As Section III.A has
discussed, a gift of confidential information to anyone is enough to constitute insider trading. But the
Government's "noncorporate purpose" test fails because it does not comport with the functional test
outlined in Dirks and that I espouse here.
137 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,648-49 (1983).
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giving the profits to Dirks?... In other words, would giving money have worked as
well as giving information? The answer here is dearly no. If Secrist had walked into
Dirks's office and plunked a large wad of cash on Dirks's desk, it certainly would
have raised Dirks's eyebrows, but it would not have helped to expose the corporate
fraud. The inside information itself was necessary to do that-money alone could
not have substituted.
In Newman, there were a great many tipper-tippee relationships."' I will focus
on one in particular-the initial tipper-tippee set, consisting of Rob Ray (the initial
Dell insider) and Sandy Goyal.'" According to the Government, Ray's purpose in
divulging the inside information to Goyal was to obtain "career advice and
assistance," such as help with his r6sum6 and tips on how to pass the certification
examination to become a financial analyst.'41 The Second Circuit found this help to
be too insubstantial to constitute a personal benefit to Ray.'42 But if we assume that
the Government's characterization of Ray's purpose was accurate4 3 and apply the
functional test, it is clear that the Second Circuit was mistaken. The Government's
allegation is essentially that Ray purchased career advice with the information. Could
Ray have traded on the inside information himself and then paid for this career
advice (however insubstantial) with the profits? Most likely, yes. Therefore, under
the true functional test of Dirks, Ray personally benefitted from his disclosure of
inside information.
Salman presents an easy case. Maher admitted that he gave the inside
information to Michael as a gift "'to help him' and to 'fulfil[l] whatever needs he
had.""' Clearly, then, even though Michael showed a preference for information to
money,1 45 Maher could have traded on the information himself and given the cash
profits to Michael to accomplish the same purpose.'"
The next illustration comes from a question asked by Chief Justice Roberts
during the Sahnan oral arguments. He hypothesized a situation in which a group of
acquaintances want to go away for the weekend and ask the tipper to join them.1
47
1s Id at 654, 659, 667.
139 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014).
140 id.
141 Id. at 452.
142 Sccid. at 453 ("Here the 'career advice' that Goyal gave Ray, the Dell tipper, was little more than
the encouragement one would generally expect of a fellow alumnus or casual acquaintance.").
143 Which, to be clear, the Second Circuit found the government's characterization to be false because
"Goyal testified that he would have given Ray advice without receiving information" and that he had
already been doing so for "over a year before Ray began providing any insider information." Id. That does
not affect our current analysis, however, in which we will simply assume that the Government's
characterization of Ray's purpose was correct (and because the Second Circuit ultimately did not say what
Ray's purpose in disclosing the information was if not for career advice).
" Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420,424 (2016) (alteration in original).
145 See id. ("Michael once called Maher and told him that 'he needed a favor.' Maher offered his
brother money but Michael asked for information instead." (citation omitted)).
146 Id. at 427-28.
147 Transcript of Oral Argument at 24-25, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628).
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The tipper says he cannot join them, and when his acquaintances ask why, he
negligently discloses inside information about a project he has to work on that
weekend, leading his acquaintances to trade on that information.'4 8 Assume that the
jury believes the tipper when he says that his purpose in making this disclosure was
not to make a gift to his acquaintances, but instead to explain why he could not
accompany them on their weekend trip. In that case, the functional test reveals that
the tipper did not personally benefit from his disclosure. The tipper could not explain
to his acquaintances why he could not accompany them by trading on the inside
information himself and then giving them the profits. The information itself, not the
money the information was worth, provides the explanation. Because money could
not substitute for the information, the tipper did not personally benefit from his
disclosure.
Justice Roberts's hypothetical also reveals a criticism of the functional test. One
may argue that the test invites too much gamesmanship; tippers could divulge inside
information with the intent that the tippee trade on it and then claim the information
was accidentally divulged in an invented social scenario where the inside information
itself was the answer to an innocent question. But for this end-run of the system to
work, the jury would have to believe the defendant's story. The tipper's intent in
divulging the inside information is a fact question, like any other. A juror need not
take the tipper's word for it. If the jury does not buy the tipper's story, and instead
finds that the tipper's purpose was to make a gift of the valuable information, then
the tipper will be found to have personally benefited from his disclosure and will be
liable.
The next scenario comes from an insider trader training video used by many law
firms and companies.4" An employee on an online forum reads a thread of posts that
speaks poorly of his employer.so Incensed, the employee acts to defend his company
by responding to the posts.'' Unfortunately, his response posts contain inside
information on which others in the forum proceed to trade.52 The insider trading
training video treated this scenario as a hard, borderline case.' But the answer is
dear under the functional test. The employee could not have accomplished his
purpose-defending his employer's reputation-by trading on inside information
himself and then divvying the profits between the other persons on the forum.154 The
information itself was the defense, not the profits derived therefrom.
148 Id. at 25.
1
4 9 
THINK TWICE: THE SEQUEL (Brumberg Publications 1992).
150 Id.
152
153Id.
154 Perhaps he could do so as a bribe to keep the others from making future posts or to encourage the
others to delete their past posts, but the facts here do not indicate that the employee was divulging the
information as a bribe. If, however, the information was intended as a bribe, then the functional test would
handle that situation as well. A bribe could be made in cash just as easily as (if not more easily than) in
inside information. As such, the functional test confirms that using inside information as a bribe
constitutes a personal benefit to the tipper. This example also shows the importance of how one
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But the functional test is not magic. It does not eliminate the fact that there are
hard cases, "factual circumstances [in which] assessing liability for gift-giving will be
difficult.""ss The following is an example of such a case. Tippee is a college student
taking a class on investing. Part of the class involves a simulated stock market
competition in which the students start with a set amount of fake money and invest
it in the market. Whoever has the most fake money at the end of the semester gets
extra credit. Tippee really wants that extra credit, so he asks his friend, Tipper, who
works at a tech company, for inside information to help him win the competition.
Tipper obliges, expecting that Tippee would never actually trade on the information
in the real market. But, of course, Tippee does just that. At the outset, it seems under
the plain language of Dirks that Tipper personally benefits from this disclosure-
Tipper "ma[de] a gift of confidential information to [Tippee]" and had "an intention
to benefit the particular recipient[]" Tippee, by helping him to win the competition
and get the extra credit.1 6 It is possible that a court would end its analysis there.
But the functional test, which provides the theoretical underpinning for why gifts
of information constitute personal benefits to tippers,1s? adds an extra layer of
intrigue. In this case, Tipper could not have accomplished his purpose of helping
Tippee win the competition by trading on the inside information himself and giving
the profits to Tippee. In order to win the competition, Tippee needs the information
on which to trade in the simulated stock market, not cash. Thus, although Tipper
appears to be making a gift of valuable inside information to Tippee, the functional
test reveals that this fact pattern does not meet the original justifications that the
Supreme Court provided to explain why gifts of such information provide a personal
benefit to the tipper."s For that reason, Tipper would probably not be liable for
insider trading in this case, but it is a hard case.
These examples show both the descriptive and predictive utility of the functional
test as I have characterized it. It is descriptive in that it derives from Supreme Court
precedent and comes to the correct conclusion in all of the historical cases to which
we applied it.is' It is predictive in that it provides an easy-to-apply test for coming
to uniform, reasoned conclusions in previously difficult tipper-tippee insider trading
scenarios involving non-pecuniary exchanges that have not yet come before any
court. And, significantly for continued analysis, it does not predicate criminal liability
on the status of the tippee as a trading relative or friend of the tipper. Therefore, the
test may be applied to a broad range of tipper-tippee configurations.
characterizes the tipper's purpose in an insider trading case. The line between "defending the company"
and "silencing the others on this forum" can easily become fuzzy, but which side of the line you are on
completely changes the analysis. Id.
'ss Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428-29 (2016).
15 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
117 Id.; Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428; see also supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
.s. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
1s9 Id. at 667 (affirming acquittal); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014)
(supporting abrogation); Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 429 (affirming conviction).
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B. Then Is the Trading-Relative-or-Fiend Test Mere Surplusage? No. ItIs an
Evidentiary Rule.
This brings us to our second question: If the trading-relative-or-friend test is not
a liability standard affecting the limits of what conduct is and is not subject to
criminal liability, then what, if anything, does that language do?
One possibility is that this language is surplusage, having no content or effect
whatsoever. Under this theory, the Court's lone reference "to a trading relative or
friend" in Dirks is merely an illustrative tool.16 0 That reference provides one example
among many of persons to whom "an insider [may] make[] a gift of confidential
information"161 that would result in personal benefit to the insider. Using trading
relatives or friends as an example makes sense because those are the persons with
whom an insider is most likely to discuss the inside information.162 But this trading-
relative-or-friend example does not constitute a special category or establish anysort
of rule. The same inference of personal benefit could arise from a gift to any random
person. As discussed in Section III.A, such an interpretation is compatible with the
functional test of "Dirks's gift-giving standard."'63
Likewise, under this theory of surplusage, the Court's many references to a
"trading relative or friend" in Salmanl64 merely reflect the particular facts of the
case. 6 s The three persons at the heart of Salman-Maher Kara, Michael Kara, and
Bassam Salman-were all related by either blood or marriage and were all
acknowledged to be dose to each other.16 6 Thus, there was no need to discuss gifts
of inside information outside the context of gifts between family and friends.167
Because of this, it is wrong to read too much into the Court's repeated use of the
"trading relative or friend" language-Sabnan's facts simply did not offer the Court
the ideal vehicle with which to talk about gifts to other persons that would constitute
a personal benefit to the tipper. 6 Therefore, it is possible to argue that the trading-
relative-or-friend language does not provide a rule of liability, but is instead surplus
160 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
161 id.
162 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 47 (Kagan, J.) ("On the other hand, as you
say, almost all of these [tipper-tippee] cases [involve] relatives and friends."); Crimmins, supra note 109,
at 347 ("People who talk about a stock will almost always be acquaintances, and this is easily perceived as
being friends. It will be rare that a case involves complete strangers discussing a stock.").
161 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427-28 (2016); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
164 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425-28.
165 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
166 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423-24.
167 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 47.
168 Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope oflnsider Trading, 69 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE
46, 47-48, 54 (2016); see also Randall Eliason, The Supreme Court, Salman, and Insider Trading: Why
Stock Tips Make Bad Stocking Stuffers, SIDEBARS (Dec. 13, 2016), https://sidebarsblog.com/the-
supreme-court-salman-and-inside-trading-why-stock-tips-make-bad-stocking-stuffers/
[https://perma.cc/CD4K-DH95].
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language reflecting one example among many of persons to whom gifts of inside
information may be made.
This conclusion, however, conflicts with the canon of construction against
surplusage.69 The surplusage canon, in its simplest form, states that "[e]very word
and clause must be given effect."170 In other words, the surplusage canon presumes
that every word in a legal text "has meaning rather than being surplusage."' The
application of canons of construction to judicial decisions seems unorthodox
(traditionally the canons are used in statutory and constitutional interpretation),'17 2
but it is not wholly unprecedented.7 1
Beyond violating the surplusage canon, treating the "family or friends" language
as surplusage ignores the bulk of the discussion during Salman's oral argument.
During oral argument, the Justices emphasized that doing something for dose family
and friends is somehow qualitatively different from doing the same thing for a
random person.7 4 Justice Breyer was particularly adamant on this point, highlighting
that "the statute books [are] filled with instances where the public wants to know,
not just how [one] might benefit, but how [one's] family might benefit[.]"'7 Justice
Breyer continued, "And of course I can suggest a reason [for why the public wants
16 This canon of construction is also referred to as the "superfluity canon" and the "textual integrity
canon." Stephen M. Durden, Textualfst Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 115, 122 (2010) (first quoting Damien M. Schiff, Purposivism and the "Reasonable Legislator"
A ReviewEssay offustice Stephen Breyer'sActive Liberty, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1081, 1087 n.37
(2007); and then quoting Brian M. Saxe, When a Rigid Textualism Fails: Damages for ADA
Employment Retaliation, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 555, 578 n.145 (2006)).
"70 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 404 (1950). Professor Llewellyn wrote this
famous article in part to show that the vaunted canons of construction are mutually contradictory and not
a principled basis for decision making-the Professor attempts to show that for every canon there is an
equal and opposite canon. Id at 401. Whether he succeeds in his attempt is up for debate. Regardless of
one's opinion on the legitimacy and usefisness of the canons of construction, their continuing influence
and prominence in certain schools of legal thought is undeniable. As such, considering the applicability
of any canon of construction is worthy of our time.
171 William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning,
and the Case ofAmar'Bil ofRights, 106 MICH. L. REv. 487, 532 (2007).
172 See Durden, supra note 169, at 122 (discussing the applicability of the surplusage canon in
statutory and constitutional interpretation, but mentioning nothing of its application in the interpretation
of judicial decisions).
173 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 703 (4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, J., concurring)
(applying a canon of statutory construction to conclude that the Supreme Court's "armed and dangerous"
standard for determining the appropriateness of a frisk following an investigatory stop constitutes two
separate requirements rather than a "unitary concept").
174 See Amy Howe, Arigument Analysis: The "Friends and Family" Solution for Insider
Trading, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 5, 2016, 5:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/10/argument-
analysis-the-friends-and-family-solution-for-insider-trading/ [https://perma.cc/9MR7-3D5X]
(discussing the oral argument before the Supreme Court in Salman).
175 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 7.
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to know how your family might benefit]. Because they think very often ... to help a
close family member is like helping yourself."17 6
This creates tension within the law."' On the one hand, treating a family-or-
friend relationship between the tipper and the tippee as a necessary element of insider
trading liability is wrong.78 Even Justice Breyer recognized that a per se assumption
of personal benefit o the tipper when the tippee is a family member or friend is not
the proper course of action."' But on the other hand, the Justices plainly think that
dose, familial or personal relationships are important and have some role to play in
insider trading law (in other words, the trading-relative-or-friend language is not
merely surplusage).'s The best way to resolve this tension in the law is by treating
the trading-relative-or-friend test as an evidentiary rule.
The substance of this evidentiary rule is this: when a tipper provides material,
non-public information to a trading family or friend, the jury may, from this alone,
infer that the tipper intended to make a gift of the information (and consequently
provide the tipper with a personal benefit). That evidence is itself sufficient to sustain
a conviction. But note that this is a permissive rule. There is no requirement that a
jury must infer donative intent or personal benefit just because the tipper and tippee
have a dose, personal relationship.' Rather, the jury mayinfer donative intent from
that evidence. In other words, the Government meets its burden of production,
though not its burden of persuasion, on the issue of personal benefit whenever it
shows that the tipper and tippee are dose family or friends.'82
If, however, a tipper and tippee are not "family or friends," such an inference is
not automatically permissible."' Instead, the Government must, through other
evidence, show that the tipper intended the information as a gift to the tippee. In
that way, Dirks's functional test is still applied (i.e., a gift of inside information to
any trading person, regardless of the recipient's identity, constitutes a benefit to the
tipper)-it is simply a more difficult test to meet when the parties are not relatives
or friends.'84
This evidentiary rule is supported by the language of the Court's Salman opinion.
In Salman, the Court reasoned that "when a tipper gives inside information to 'a
trading relative or friend,' the jury can infer that the tipper meant to provide the
176 Id. at 8.
177 This tension has not gone unnoticed in the short months following the Salman decision. See
Guttentag, supra note 7 (pointing at the seeming gap in logic between the gift-giving and "trading relative
or friend" standards in Dirks and lamenting the Court's failure to address the issue more directly in
Salman).
178 See supra Section III.A.
179 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 8 ("[Vlery often, though it depends on
familes, to help a close family member is like helping yourself. That's not true ofafanl es ... but [for]
many it is.") (emphasis added).
18 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
182 See Salman v. United States 137 S. Ct. 423, 427-28 (2016); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664
(1983).
183 See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427-28; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
184 See Saman, 137 S. Ct. at 427-29.
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equivalent of a cash gift."'s The "can" in that line is important. It allows a jury not
to infer that a tipper made a gift of inside information, even when presented with a
transfer of confidential, inside information between relatives or friends. Contrast that
with the rule that would exist if we were to replace the word "can" with "must." In
that situation, a jury presented with a tipper who gave inside information to a relative
or friend would be required to find that the tipper meant to provide a gift to the
tippee. Such a rule would be a rule of decision rather than an evidentiary rule. Thus,
the flexibility inherent in the word "can" provides evidence that the trading-relative-
or-friend test is an evidentiary rule.
Justice Breyer's remarks at oral arguments also support construing the trading-
relative-or-friend test as an evidentiary rule. As was mentioned earlier, Justice Breyer
was the strongest supporter during oral arguments of the idea that doing something
to benefit a family member inherently inures to the benefit of the doer.186 But before
he fully embraced the idea, he blinked, admitting that this would "not [be] true of
all families." 8 Justice Breyer's hesitancy maps perfectly onto a conception of the
trading-relative-or-friend test as an evidentiary rule. First, in line with the idea that
something done "to help a dose family member is like helping yourself,"1 8 the jury
may infer that a tipper personally benefitted from giving inside information to a
trading friend or relative. But once this presumption is in place, the defendant must
always have a chance to show that his family/friendship is not one in which the
presumption is true, or that other circumstances show that the tipper's intent in
giving the information was not donative. This gives effect to Justice Breyer's "not
true of all families" reservation.'9 Thus, treating the trading-relative-or-friend test
as an evidentiary rule properly recognizes the general principle that helping one's
family or friends helps oneself while also recognizing that there are exceptions.
How might this rule work in practice? Envision a variation on the facts of Dirks.
Keeping all other facts the same, imagine that Secrist and Dirks were actually
cousins. In this case, because Secrist and Dirks would be related, it would be
permissible (though not required) for the jury to infer from the mere conveyance of
inside information between them that Secrist, the tipper, intended to make a gift to
Dirks, the tippee. Therefore, the jury could infer that Secrist personally benefited
from his tip to Dirks and could conclude that Secrist had breached his fiduciary duty,
which would expose both Secrist and Dirks to insider trading liability. The
Government would need to present no other evidence of intent. Dirks and Secrist
could overcome this presumption, perhaps, by pointing to the circumstances
surrounding the tip (i.e., Secrist's desire to expose fraud and his previous attempts to
do so through the proper agency channels), but the familial relationship would, on
11s Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
186 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 8 (positing that "to help a close family
member is like helping yourself").
187 id
188 Id
189 Id
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its own, be enough to sustain the conclusion that the transfer of inside information
between them was intended as a gift and establish a prima facie case of insider
trading.
Compare this with the factual reality of Dirks. Secrist and Dirks were not in any
way related or even friends. Therefore, under the proposed evidentiary standard, it
would not be permissible to infer that Secrist made a gift of the inside information
to Dirks from the mere fact that the tip was made (which corresponds with how
Dirks actually came out). Instead, the Government would have to offer up further
evidence indicating that Secrist intended the information as a gift or otherwise
personally benefited from the tip. This is an easy, workable standard that gives
meaning and relevance both to Dirks's functional test and to Salman's trading-
relative-or-friend language, resolves the tension between them, and reads neither as
surplusage.
C. Who Counts as a Relative or Fiend? Leave it to the jury
Having established that the trading-relative-or-friend test is an evidentiary rule,
we now must ask who qualifies as a relative or friend. This question has haunted
practitioners,'90 academics,'9' and judges,'92 all of whom have expressed concern that
too broad an understanding of who counts as a relative or friend would swallow the
personal-benefit rule. This Article has already addressed part of this concern.
Because the trading-relative-or-friend test is an evidentiary rule and not a rule of
decision for determining whether a tipper has received a personal benefit," there is
no need to worry that a broad understanding of who counts as a relative or friend
will swallow the personal-benefit rule. But the evidentiary rule still has bite to it, and
too loose a conception of who meets the test could still result in improper convictions
by allowing juries to infer the existence of gifts and personal benefits in cases where
the relationship between the tipper and tippee is too attenuated to justify the
inference. As such, it is still important to set out who qualifies as a relative or friend.
There are three basic options for how to answer this question. First, one could
try to create a set list of all the legal relationships that are sufficient to meet the
trading-relative-or-friend test. Second, one could leave the inquiry entirely open-
ended and let the jury (or other factfinder) decide the question based on the totality
190 See, e.g., SULLIVAN &CROMWELL, supra note 10 (asking "what sort of relationship is sufficient
to meet the 'relative or friend test?"').
191 See, e.g., Crimmins, supra note 109, at 347-48 (worrying about recent cases suggesting "that
virtually any 'friendship' will automatically satisfy the benefit requirement" and approving other cases
suggesting that a benefit can only be implied "where the people involved [have] a much closer relationship
than simply being friends'").
192 See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) ("[T]he Government may
[not] prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or
social nature. If that were true, and the Government [were] allowed to meet its burden by proving that
two individuals were alumni of the same school or attended the same church, the personal benefit
requirement would be a nullity.").
193 See supra Sections III.A and III.B.
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of the circumstances. Third, one could try to split the difference, establishing by law
that certain relationships always meet the trading-relative-or-friend test while
leaving open the possibility that other relationships may, depending on the
circumstances, also satisfy the test. Of these options, I believe that the second is the
appropriate course. The factfinder should always be permitted to look at the totality
of the circumstances to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether a given relationship
meets the test.
The first option, which involves creating a list categorizing some relationships as
per se legally sufficient to meet the trading-relative-or-friend test, has a certain
appeal to it. Such lists would make the vast majority of inquiries quick and easy. It is
also an approach that the government has adopted for other purposes.'9 4 For
example, whenever a person requires a security clearance from the national
government, that person must fill out the Standard Form 86: Questionnaire for
National Security Positions."'s Section 18 of that form requires the applicant to
provide information about all of the following relatives: mother, father, stepmother,
stepfather, foster parent, children, stepchildren, brothers, sisters, stepbrothers,
stepsisters, half-brothers, half-sisters, father-in-law, mother-in-law, and other
guardians.'16 It is not unreasonable to argue that if this list of relatives is all the
government needs to know about to grant a security clearance, then it should be an
adequate list for establishing who meets the trading-relative portion of the trading-
relative-or-friend test.
But the shortcomings of any approach involving lists of legally sufficient
relationships are obvious. Look again at the list of familial relations on Form 86.19'
Despite listing sixteen different familial relations,"' Form 86 hardly scratches the
surface of what some people would consider to be the full list of meaningful familial
relationships. Notably absent from the list are aunts, uncles, grandmothers,
grandfathers, cousins, brothers-in law, and sisters-in-law, just to name a few. Indeed,
if the list of relatives from Form 86 were adopted as the official list of relations
meeting the trading-relatives test, then Maher Kara could have bypassed his brother,
given the inside information to Salman (his brother-in-law) directly and avoided any
ill effects from the trading-relative-or-friend test.
So where would be the proper place to draw the line between familial
relationships that satisfy the test and those that do not? We may all be able to agree
'94 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 7 (Breyer, J.) (mentioning the numerous
relatives that Justice Breyer is required to disclose and the numerous statutes requesting to know about
specific family members).
195 Standard Form 86: Questionnaire for National Secnity Positions, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MGMT. (Dec. 2010), https://www.opm.gov/forms/pdffill/sf86-non508.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9MIL-
KVAE] [hereinafter Form 86].
196 Id. § 18.
' See supra text accompanying note 196.
19s See Form 86, supra note 194, § 18.
KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL
that one's "third cousin's brother's wife's step-niece's great aunt twice removed"' is
too distant a relation to be included; but somewhere short of that a line would need
to be drawn. Wherever the line is drawn, the resulting list will always be too broad
for some persons, including relatives to whom the persons have no meaningful
connection whatsoever, and too narrow for others, excluding relatives who form a
central aspect of the persons' lives.
Adopting the third option does not fix this problem. The third option would
intentionally create a narrow list of relationships that always satisfy the trading-
friend-or-relative test. This list would contain only the most commonly recognized
familial and friendly relations-siblings, parents, children, roommates, schoolmates,
and other such seemingly universal connections-while allowing the factfinder to
find additional relationships to be sufficient on a case-by-case basis. This way, the
most common cases would always benefit from the evidentiary rule. But even this
attempt at a narrow-but-flexible approach is necessarily too broad. Saying that any
category of relationships per se satisfies the trading-relative-or-friend test ignores the
complexity of human relations. There are outliers even in the most universally
recognized relations. Children get disowned. Siblings become estranged.
Roommates have faillings out. Spouses separate. Even if these situations are rarely
before the courts in an insider trading case, given their existence, it seems unjust, or
at least lazy, to paint even the most common of familial and friendly relationships
with a broad brush.
The lists mentioned so far have only included family members and other narrowly
defined relationships. But how would one make a categorical list of friendships (or
at least non-familial relations) that would per se satisfy the test? Should all former
roommates count? Classmates? Members of your peewee league baseball team from
thirty years ago? Clearly not. Lists of defined relationships, then, are inherently
flawed and unsuited to the task at hand.
This leaves us with the second option-leaving the inquiry to be decided, in every
instance, by the factfinder based on the totality of the circumstances. This is certainly
the least efficient option. But it is also likely to be the most accurate. A jury of peers
can understand the cultural and personal backgrounds of the accused and perceive
the nuances of the accused's relationship with another person better than any
unfeeling list ever could.
But that only answers the question of who should decide what relationships
count. The real question remains: What relationships satisfy the trading-relative-or-
friend test? What is the standard against which such a finding is to be judged?
Answering these questions requires a common-sense approach. On the one hand,
we want to avoid absurdities in which the government tries to draw meaning from
casual or attenuated relationships between the tipper and the tippee. On the other
hand, the factfinder needs to be given the flexibility to take the complexities of
human relationships into account when making a decision.
199
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Given these considerations, the only good guidance is that provided in Newman
(which was not overturned, only abrogated in part),2" namely that there must be
"proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship."20' Such relationships, whether
they are familial or friendly, create the sort of connection that reasonably justifies
application of the trading-friend-or-relative test. Thus, the answer to the question
of who counts as a relative or friend is any person with whom a tipper has a
"meaningfully dose personal relationship."20 2 Admittedly, this is not a strong rule of
decision. But it does provide a check on government abuse and comport with Justice
Breyer's statement that "to help a close family member is like helping yourself."
Closeness is the key.
CONCLUSION
This Article reaches three basic conclusions: (1) The true test for determining
whether a tipper in an insider trading case receives a non-pecuniary personal benefit
from disclosing inside information is the same regardless of the tipper's relation to
the tippee-whether money could have substituted for the inside information to
accomplish the tipper's purpose. (2) The trading-relative-or-friend test is an
evidentiary rule allowing a jury to assume that a tipper makes a gift upon providing
inside information to a trading relative or friend. (3) Persons who count as relatives
or friends are those with meaningfully close personal relationships to the tipper as
determined by the factfinder based on the totality of circumstances.
At this point, most articles would go on about how a fairer and more just world
would emerge if only the proper governing body would formally endorse or adopt
their conclusions. This is not one of those articles. My conclusions are purely
descriptive, aiming to distill and restate the personal-benefit test as it now stands
from the confusing jumble of judicial statements creating it. In other words, my
conclusions aim to describe the state of the law as it now is or will come to be, not
the state of the law as it should be.
Consider the various principles of insider trading law discussed in this Article:
the classical theory, the misappropriation theory, partial abrogation, the trading-
friend-or-relative test, the personal-benefit est, derivative liability, fiduciary duties,
etc. This is confusing, complicated stuff. How is the average market participant
supposed to learn about these principles and conform his conduct to them? He
cannot look to legislative statutes, for Congress passed a vague, general statute in the
form of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 that mentions none of
the principles discussed in this Article. He also cannot look to executive regulations,
for the SEC passed an equally vague, general regulation in the form of Rule 10b--5
20 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 423,428 (2016).
201 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
202 Id.
203 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 8 (emphasis added).
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that likewise mentions none of the principles discussed in this Article. Instead, he
must look to the voluminous and seemingly contradictory common law of insider
trading that courts have developed. This common law is scattered across multiple
opinions, multiple years, multiple jurisdictions, and multiple levels of courts. And
not all of these opinions remain good law. Then, even if he can find all of the relevant
cases, each case is merely precedent, constrained by its particular facts-an inherent
weakness of the common law method. This leaves him to guess how the vague,
general rules announced in previous cases will be applied in his own case (or whether
the courts will come up with an entirely new principle of which he had absolutely no
notice). Maybe he has the resources to hire an expensive, high-powered attorney to
go through this mess for him, but most likely he does not.
Thus, each branch of our government has neglected its responsibility to set
forth clear rules with which market participants may confidently conform their
behavior. This arcane system of insider trading law is reminiscent of a story about
the Roman Emperor Caligula as recounted by then-Judge Gorsuch:
[H]istory bears warning that too much-and too much inaccessible-law
can lead to [government excesses]. Caligula sought to protect his authority
by publishing the law in a hand so small and posted so high that no one
could really be sure what was and wasn't forbidden. No doubt all the better
to keep us on our toes.204
This state of affairs is neither just nor fair.
But it does not need to stay this way. In recent years, Congress has considered
several bills that would entirely do away with our current system of insider trading
and replace it with a simplified, statutory crime complete with definitions of the key
terms.2 05 One-the Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act-came close to saying "Thou
shalt not knowingly trade on the basis of material, non-public information nor
disclose such information to anyone who is likely to trade on it."20 6 Such a simple
approach would sweep more broadly than the current approach, but it would have
204 Judge Neil M. Gorsuch, U.S. Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit, 13th Annual Barbara K. Olson
Memorial Lecture at the 2013 National Lawyer's Convention, at 12:45 (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/videos/13th-annual-barbara-k-olson-memorial-lecture-event-audio-
video [https://perma.cc/4DJB-CDB2].
25 E.g., Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015); Ban Insider Trading Act of
2015, H.R. 1097, 114th Cong. (2015); Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).
206 The bill would have made it a crime:
(A) To purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or sale of any security on the basis of material information
that the person knows or has reason to know is not publicly available.
(B) To knowingly or recklessly communicate material information that the person knows or has
reason to know is not publicly available to any other person under circumstances in which it is reasonably
foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in a violation of subparagraph (A).
S. 702 § 2. In essence, subparagraph (A) criminalizes trading on material, non-public information
and subparagraph (B) criminalizes disclosing material, non-public information to persons likely to trade
on that information. This is a good law (or it would have been, if it had passed). It is a clear, easy-to-
understand law that any lay person could easily access and use to guide his or her conduct when
participating in the securities market.
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the benefit of being accessible and easy to understand. As such, normal people could
confidently conform their behavior to the law without the need of constantly staying
"on their toes."
Unfortunately, none of these bills became law. But this Article's purpose is not
to analyze alternative insider trading statutes in any depth. The point is merely that
our current system of insider trading laws is inaccessible and needlessly complicated.
Remedying the situation will require a massive overhaul of the entire insider trading
system, a topic beyond the scope of this Article. But until such time as Congress
decides to reform the entire system, I hope that my conclusions will bring some
clarity to this needlessly confusing area of the law.

